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COMMENTS
'PROSECUToR's DUTY TO DISCLOSE RECONSIDERED
United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976)
In United States v. Agurs,' the Supreme Court extended the prose-
cutor's constitutional duty to disclose material evidence to the defend-
ant in the absence of a specific request, but adopted a harsh standard
of materiality reflective of the Court's changing attitude toward the re-
quirements of procedural due process. Charged with second degree
murder for the stabbing death of one Sewell, respondent sought to
establish at trial that Sewell had a violent character, and that she had
stabbed him in self-defense.2 Several months after her conviction, 8 her
attorney moved for a new trial, alleging that the prosecutor's failure
to reveal Sewell's past criminal record4 denied her due process under
the fifth amendment. 5 After the District Court for the District of Col-
umbia denied respondent's motion, 6 the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the prosecutor's failure
to reveal material evidence to the defense constituted a denial of the
respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial despite the absence of
a specific request during the trial for such information.7 The court
found decedent's prior criminal record sufficiently material to merit a
a new trial because "if brought to the attention of the jury, '[it] might
have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about appellant's
guilt.' ,,8 The Supreme Court reversed, and held: The due process
1. 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
2. Id. at 2395-96.
3. Id. at 2395.
4. Id. at 2396. Sewell's prior criminal record included a guilty plea to a charge of
assault and carrying a deadly weapon in 1963 and to a charge of carrying a deadly
weapon in 1971.
5. See notes 11-20 infra and accompanying text.
6. The court found that the evidence was not material. See United States v.
Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
7. Id.
8. Id., citing Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The
Supreme Court inaccurately described the District of Columbia Circuit's standard:
flits nondisclosure [referring to Sewell's prior criminal record] required a new
480
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clause of the fifth amendment requires a prosecutor to disclose volun-
tarily to the defense material exculpatory evidenceY The standard of
materiality is whether the undisclosed evidence, evaluated in the con-
text of the entire trial record, creates in the mind of the reviewing judge
a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt or innocence.10
The fifth and fourteenth amendments mandate that no person be
denied life, liberty, or property without due process of law.'1 Tradi-
tionally, denial of due process in a criminal trial was "the failure to ob-
serve that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of just-
tice."' Due process was violated only when the act complained of
fatally infected the fairness of the conviction or shocked the "universal
sense of justice."'13 The Warren Court considerably expanded the
specific procedural rights due a criminal defendant 14 because it consid-
trial because the jury might have returned a different verdict if the evidence
had been received.
United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976).
9. United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2401 (1976).
10. Id. at 2401-02.
11. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963); Griffin v. United States, 336
U.S. 704, 708-09 (1950); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 473 (1941); Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110-14
(1935).
12. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). See also Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 492-94 (1943); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 473 (1941);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110-13 (1935).
13. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 463 (1941). Accord, Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 236-38 (1941). See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 103 (1939)
(inducing defendant by threats to testify against himself); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1935) (extorting testimony by physical torture); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935) (suborning perjured testimony by prosecution); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1922) (trial dominated by mob violence).
14. The Warren Court articulated a series of specific procedural safeguards embod-
ied within the Bill of Rights intended not merely to protect the accused from overreach-
ing by the state, but also to protect the integrity of the judicial system. Its decisions
developing the prosecutor's duty to disclose gave substance to the fifth and fourteenth
amendment guarantee of procedural due process. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) (fifth and fourteenth amendment fair trial requirement). See also Spinette v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (fourth amendment warrant provisions); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment jury trial clause); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (sixth amendment compulsory press clause); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment confrontation of witness
clause); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sixth amendment assistance of coun-
sel clause); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment search and seizure
provision). See generally Fahringer, Has Anyone Here Seen Brady?: Discovery in
Criminal C'wes, 9 CRiM. L. BULL. 325 (1973); George, From Warren to Burger to
Chance-Future Trends in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 12 CRim. L. BULL.
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ered the procedural aspects of the trial to be as important as the accur-
acy of the factfinding process.' 5 The traditional "fundamental fair-
ness" standard, in the Warren Court's view, was too vague to ensure
the requisite procedural fairness.13
The Burger Court has significantly retreated from this position in
articulating a constitutional philosophy consonant with more traditional
concepts of due process.17  Under this approach the central concern
in criminal proceedings is the ultimate question of guilt or innocence,",
and procedures are simply a means to achieve the ultimate goals of the
legal system, truth and justice.19 Unlike its predecessor, the present
Court has focused predominantly on the accuracy of the verdict. Ac-
cordingly, the Court has been reluctant to overturn convictions because
of constitutionally deficient procedures absent a showing of fundamen-
tal injustice in the result or procedures that shock the conscience of
the Court.20
In Brady v. Maryland," the Warren Court found that the fair trial
requirement implicit in the fourteenth amendment required the pros-
253 (1976); Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MicH. L. REv. 249
(1968); Rosen, Contemporary Winds and Currents in Criminal Law, with Special Refer-
ence to Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Defense and Appreciation, 27 MD. L
REV. 103 (1967).
15. See notes 80-85 infra and accompanying text.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S.
Ct. 3037, 3049-50 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434-36 (1973).
18. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3049-50 (1976); United States v. Agurs, 96 S.
Ct. 2392, 2401 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 274 (1973) (concur-
ring opinion). See generally Nakell, The Effect of Due Process on Criminal Defense
Discovery, 62 Ky. L.J. 58, 58, 59 (1973); Shapiro, Searches, Seizures and Lineups:
Evolving Constitutional Standards Under the Warren and Burger Courts, 20 N.Y.L.F.
217 (1974); Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 Go.
L.I. 249 (1971); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 422-26 (1974).
19. United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2401-02 (1976). The Burger Court his
noted that undue consideration of the procedural aspects of the trial intrudes on three
important values: 1) effective maintenance of limited judicial resources; 2) the necessity
of finality in criminal trials; and, 3) the deterrent function of the law. Stone v. Powell,
96 S. Ct. 3037, 3049-50 (1976). See note 18 supra.
20. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (fourth amendment search and
seizure); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (fourth amend-
ment search and seizure clause); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)
(entrapment); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (fifth amendment fair trial
requirement).
21. 373 U.S. 86 (1963).
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ecution to disclose material evidence requested by the defense. 2 De-
fense counsel in Brady had specifically requested all extrajudicial state-
ments made by the defendant's accomplice;2" the prosecution disclosed
several statements, but withheld an extrajudicial confession favorable
to the defendant.24 The Supreme Court held that
[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.2 5
Although earlier cases had concentrated on the willful misbehavior of
the prosecutor,28 the Brady Court focused on the harm to the defend-
ant resulting from the nondisclosure of the evidence by the prosecu-
tion.27  Consequently, the materiality of the undisclosed evidence as-
sumed overriding significance. The Brady opinion, however, did not
set forth a standard of materiality to govern the prosecutor's constitu-
tional duty to disclose."'
Many courts29 and commentators3 ° argue that the prosecutor's duty
22. Id. at 87-88.
23. Id. at 84.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 87.
26. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28
(1957); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150 (1972); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
28. Although the Court found a violation of due process when the evidence was
material as to guilt or punishment, the Court failed to articulate a standard by which
courts and prosecutors alike could measure the significance of a particular item of
information. The same criticism can be leveled against the Agurs Court's standard. See
notes 30 & 77-79 infra and accompanying text.
29. See Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1975); Grant v.
Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1974); Raymond v. Illinois, 455 F.2d 62, 66
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 577
(2d Cir. 1969); Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 801 (5th Cir. 1968), adhered to sub.
nom. Evans v. Dutton, 441 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d
288, 297 (5th Cir. 1968); In re Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
30. Fahringer, supra note 14, at 327; Note, Discovery and Disclosures: Dual
Aspects of the Prosecutor's Role in Criminal Procedure, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. Rov. 92, 105
(1965); Note, Implementing Brady v. Maryland: An Argument for a Pretrial Open File
Policy, 43 U. CIN. L. Ruv. 889, 890 (1974); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional
Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-43 (1964); Comment,
Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 112,
112 (1972).
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to disclose arises from the government's superior discovery resources.
These authorities reason that this practical imbalance in investigative
resources causes inherent unfairness to the defendant in a criminal
trialY1 To redress this imbalance and ensure that a defendant receives
a fair opportunity to use all favorable evidence, the prosecutor is obli-
gated to make certain affirmative disclosures.32  This duty to disclose
neither requires full disclosure 3 nor permits a "combing of the pros-
ecutors' files" for all information conceivably useful to the defendant.8 4
Courts have, therefore, required prosecutors to disclose only evidence
favorable to an accused 5 and material to the question of guilt or pun-
ishmenV6 or affecting the credibility of a key prosecution witness.87
Prior to United States v. Agurs,38 courts employed essentially three
standards of materiality when a defendant first discovered favorable
evidence after his conviction. When the prosecutor deliberately sup-
pressed evidence favorable to the accused, knowingly relied on false
testimony, or otherwise acted in bad faith, courts have adopted an
almost per se rule of materiality. 89 The standard generally applied is
whether the suppressed evidence "might in any reasonable likelihood
have affected the judgment of the jury. '40  To deter prosecutorial mis-
conduct which by itself undermines the integrity of the judicial system,
31. See notes 29 & 30 supra and accompanying text.
32. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963). See generally authorities cited
note 30 supra.
33. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) ("We know of no constitutional
requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense
of all police investigatory work on a case"); United States v. Bowles, 488 F.2d 1307,
1313 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 991 (1974); United States v. Brumley, 466
F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973).
34. United States v. Seijo, 514 F.2d 1357, 1364 (2d Cir. 1975), quoting United
States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968).
35. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1190 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Donatelli, 484 F.2d 505, 508 (1st Cir. 1973).
36. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1955).
37. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 460 (9th Cir. 1972).
38. 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
39. See cases cited note 26 supra.
40. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972) (emphasis added). See
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Curren v.
Delaware, 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948 (1958). See cases cited
note 26 supra.
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courts have liberally applied the "might have affected" standard.4 On
occasion, some courts have found that deliberately suppressed informa-
tion is material almost by definition. 2 Thus, the presence of prosecu-
torial misconduct often reduces the defendant's burden of proving
materiality. 3
When the prosecutor in good faith fails to disclose favorable evi-
dence, courts have imposed a more stringent standard of materiality.44
The standard widely adopted by lower federal courts was whether
"there was a significant chance that this added item [the nondisclosed
evidence], developed by skilled counsel as it would have been, could
have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid
conviction."45 Good faith materiality standards are the product of con-
41. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S.
1, 6-7 (1966); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935). See also Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 989 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); United States v. Pfingst, 490 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 919 (1974); United States v. Diaz-Rodriguez, 478 F.2d
1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1973).
42. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1968) (deliberate suppression
also includes failure to disclose information whose high probative value to the defense
could not have escaped the prosecutor's attention). The Second Circuit has adopted this
approach. See United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1969).
43. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. McCord,
509 F.2d 334, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975) (recognizing
rule); United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 14748 (2d Cir. 1968) (recognizing rule).
44. United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Marrero. 516 F.2d 12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 862 (1975); Woodcock v. Ama-
ral, 511 F.2d 985 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); United States v.
McCord, 509 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975); Grant v.
Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Pfingst, 490 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1973), ceit. denied, 414 U.S. 919 (1974); Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470 (Sth Cir.
1973); Ross v. Texas, 474 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 850 (1973);
United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d
138 (2d Cir. 1968); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v.
Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir.
1966). Negligent nondisclosure and good faith passive nondisclosure have been used
synonomously. Regardless of the label used, cases in which the prosecutor in good faith
fails to reveal evidence favorable to the accused have been analyzed in a similar fashion.
See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1975) (inadvertent failure
to disclose); Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 991 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 841 (1975) (innocent miscalculation of utility of the evidence to defendant);
United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1968) (failure to disclose where
hindsight reveals that the defense could have put the evidence to not insignificant use);
Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (good faith negligence).
45. United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
For other Second Circuit decisions adopting this standard, see United States v. Morell,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/5
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flicting goals. While the deterrent aim is paramount in deliberate sup-
pression cases, it is of minimal importance in good faith nondisclosure
situations, so that the policy underlying the finality of judgments as-
sumes a more prominent role. This policy aim must be balanced
against the constitutional goal of ensuring fairness to the defendant in
criminal proceedings."8
In determining whether a good faith nondisclosure was material,
many recent decisions have extended the scope of the prosecutor's duty
to disclose information material to the defendant's trial preparation.47
These courts have reasoned that the prosecutor's nondisclosure, even
though in good faith, may have foreclosed to defense counsel significant
524 F.2d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Hilton, 521 F.2d 164, 166 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Seijo, 514 F.2d 1357, 1365 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323,
1339 (2d Cir. 1974); Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 1969). For other federal circuit court
decisions adopting this standard, see United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1191
(8th Cir. 1976); Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 991 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. dcnied,
423 U.S. 841 (1975); Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213, 1223, (5th Cir. 1974). Deci-
sions from federal circuits other than the above have applied various standards. See,
e.g., United States v. Marrero, 516 F.2d 12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 862
(1975) (might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about defendant's
guilt); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940
(1974) (relevant evidence tending to exculpate); Clay v. Black, 455 F.2d 667 (6th Cir.
1972) (material to guilt or punishment); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt). No recent federal
court decision has applied the Agurs majority standard.
46. The due process clause of the fifth amendment requires that defendants receive a
fair trial. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Griffin v. United States, 336
U.S. 704, 707-09 (1950); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 445, 462 (1941); Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 99-102 (1967)
(Fortas, J., concurring).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Marrero, 516 F.2d 12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 862 (1975); Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bowles, 488 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 991 (1974); United
States v. Donatelli, 484 F.2d 505 (lst Cir. 1973); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455
(9th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Raymond v. Illinois, 455 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972);
Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287
(D.C. Cir. 1966). In United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1969), the Second
Circuit noted:
The significance of Brady was its holding that the concept out of which the
Constitutional dimension arises in [non-disclosure] cases, is prejudice to the
defendant measured by the effect of the suppression upon defendant's
preparation for trial ....
Id. at 577.
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lines of inquiry, thereby prejudicing defendant's constitutional right to
a fair trial.48
Courts apply the most stringent standard of materiality when evi-
dence favorable to an accused is newly discovered from a neutral
source after trial.4 " Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes applications for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence." ' The sole purpose of Rule 33 is to allow a convicted defend-
ant to secure a new trial when previously undiscovered evidence sug-
gesting innocence is uncovered from a neutral source after trial.' 1 To
merit relief a defendant must show that this evidence would probably
lead to an acquittal upon retrial.12  Prosecutorial misconduct and con-
stitutionally inadequate proceedings are not at issue in newly discov-
ered evidence cases.5 3
In United States v. Agurs,54 the majority and the dissent differed on
48. See notes 30 & 47 supra.
49. See, e~g., United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 265 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. De Sapio, 456 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972);
United States v. Rodriguez, 437 F.2d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1971); Edgar v. Finley, 312
F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1963); Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir.
1928).
50. FED. R. CiuM. P. 33 provides:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required
in the interest of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury the court
on motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered,
take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only
before or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending
the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case.
51. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 164 (1961). Newly discovered evidence
applications are generally disfavored by courts because the defendant has generally had
the ollportunity to prepare his case carefully and to secure evidence before trial. United
States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 265 (7th Cir. 1972).
52. United States v. De Sapio, 456 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
933 (1972). In a Rule 33 situation the defendant must show that:
I ) the evidence could not with due diligence have been discovered until after
the trial;
2) the evidence is material to the factual issues at the trial and not merely
cumulative and impeaching;
3) the evidence would probably produce a different result in the event of a
new trial.
Id. See cases cited note 49 supra.
53. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Kahn,
472 F 2d 272. 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); United States v. Polisi,
416 F,2d 573, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1969). In Agurs, the majority explicitly stated that the
Rule 33 standard was not appropriate when the nondiselosed evidence resided in the
possession of the prosecution. 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2401 (1976).
54. 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976).
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the appropriate standard of materiality governing the prosecutor's duty
to disclose. The majority reasoned that the standard should reflect
society's overriding interest in the accuracy of the conviction.t" It
therefore rejected a standard that concentrated on the impact of the
nondisclosed information on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial,
and fashioned one that focuses on the question of defendant's guilt or
innocence.56
The dissent accurately noted that the majority's standard, despite a
disclaimer, is coterminous with that applied in newly discovered evi-
dence cases: 7 "Surely if a judge is able to say that the evidence actu-
ally creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt in his mind [the Court's
standard], he would also conclude that the evidence probably would
have resulted in acquittal [the Rule 33 standard]."' 8  The dissent also
noted that the primary concern in nondisclosure cases is the defendant's
right to a fair trial.59 A basic element of fairness in criminal proceed-
ings is that evidence tending to show innocence as well as guilt be fully
aired before the jury.60 The dissent reasoned that the test of material-
ity should be designed to encourage disclosures by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to a defendant 1 and suggested as an appropriate
standard the "skilled counsel" formulation."2
The majority and the dissent agreed that a specific defense request
was not necessary to trigger the prosecutor's duty to disclose,61 a view
previously endorsed by most courts64 and commentators.6" The major-
55. Id. at 2401.
56. Id. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
57. Id. at 2403. Under the majority's standard in assessing materiality the fact that
the evidence was in the possession of the state becomes meaningless. In both the Rule
33 and good faith nondisclosure situations the defendant now has the burden of
convincing the reviewing judge that the evidence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt.
Indeed, the majority's standard may be more severe than the general Rule 33 standard.
Under the latter formulation the defendant need only show that a new trial would
"probably" result in a different verdict. United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2401
(1976).
58. Id. at 2403.
59. Id.
60. Id. See Moore v. fllinois, 408 U.S. 786, 810 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. 96 S. Ct. at 2404.
62. Id. at 2404-05. See cases cited note 45 supra and accompanying text.
63. See cases cited note 29 supra.
64. See authorities cited note 30 supra.
65. United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2399, 2402-03 (1976).
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ity noted that prosecutors were required to respond to a specific,66 rele-
vant defense request either by furnishing the information or by asking
the trial judge for a determination of materiality. 67  The Court neg-
lected to establish the standard of materiality a judge should apply in
such a situation. Presumably, a trial judge should apply the majority's
standard for nondisclosure cases.68
The Agurs opinion is consistent with the Burger Court's basic philo-
sophical approach in determining the constitutional rights of a defend-
ant in a criminal trial.69 Agurs reaffirms the Burger Court's belief that
the social interest in conviction of criminals and finality of judgments
outweighs the importance of specific procedural protections designed
to ensure procedural fairness to a defendant. For the Burger Court,
a trial is procedurally fair if it accurately determines the defendant's
guilt or innocence.70  Agurs reflects this concept of procedural fair-
ness. 
7 1
The result of the Agurs holding is threefold. First, the standard of
materiality in good faith nondisclosure cases is now the same as that
in newly discovered evidence cases.7 2 Second, previous lower court
decisions in good faith nondisclosure cases,7 3 and their corresponding
materiality standards,74 have essentially been eliminated. Third, the
Court's standard may also be applied by trial judges when they must
resolve the materiality of evidence specifically requested by the defense
before trial.75 These results are unsatisfactory for several reasons.
66. The majority distinguished a specific defense request from a general defense
request for all exculpatory evidence. Id. at 2399.
67. Id.
68. The majority reasoned that the same standard of materiality must logically apply
in two different contexts: the pretrial decision of the prosecutor, and the post-trial
decision of the judge. Presumably, the same standard would apply to the trial judge's
decision in an ongoing trial as well. Id. at 2399-2400.
69. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
71. The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern
with the justice of the finding of guilt . . . . If there is no reasonable doubt
about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no
justification for a new trial.
United States v. Agurs, 96 S. CL 2392, 2401-02 (1976).
72. See notes 57 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
Number 3] 489
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/5
490 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:480
First, the Agurs standard of materiality does not properly guard against
erroneous convictions. Employing the Rule 33 standard applicable to
newly discovered evidence cases to determine the materiality of Brady
requests overlooks the substantial difference in the Government's in-
vestigative efforts. After conviction the Government usually termin-
ates its investigation of the crime and consequently, vis-a-vis the de-
fendant, has no comparative advantage in unearthing new evidence.
Before trial, however, the Government's superior investigative re-
sources place the defendant at an inherent disadvantage in trial prepar-
ation.76  Prosecutors might not appreciate the value or significance of
a piece of information as fully as defense counsel,77 so that, even acting
in good faith, they may fail to reveal valuable information. The dan-
ger, of course, is that the nondisclosure of a questionably valuable piece
of information may foreclose significant lines of inquiry to the defense
counsel.78  A more lenient standard of materiality would avert this pro-
blem.79
Similarly, courts should apply a more lenient materiality standard
when reviewing evidence furnished them pursuant to a specific defense
request. Indeed, the argument for application of a lenient standard
is strongest in this situation. The policy in favor of finality of judg-
ments, prominent in nondisclosure cases, is not applicable in the con-
text of an ongoing trial. Trial judges in such situations should there-
fore be liberal in their assessments of materiality.
Second, the Agurs standard assigns undue weight to the factfinding
element of a criminal trial at the expense of equally important proced-
ural requirements. Trial procedures are more than merely a means
to determine guilt or innocence; they represent independently signifi-
cant values. 'The appearance of a fair trial is as important to society
as the correct result.8 0 More importantly, many of the procedures de-
76. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text. See also Griffin v. United States,
336 U.S. 704, 708-09 (1950) (speculative nature of review in nondisclosure cases).
79. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
80. '"There is a tremendous psychological need for the appearance of justice which a
fair trial creates in the public mind." Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of Public
Morality, in CRIMINAL JUSTCE IN OUR TIME 137, 140 (A. Howard ed. 1965). See, e.g.,
Rosen, supra note 14, at 113:
[l]n structuring and operating the system, the quest for truth ... is only one
goal that we pursue. Among other things, we also seek public morality ....
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signed to ensure a "fair trial" represent a fundamental commitment to
the integrity of each individual and to the overriding importance of in-
dividual liberty.8 They reinforce "society's ability to resist the tempta-
tion to treat innocent individuals as ultimately expendable when the
'total good' can be enhanced by their sacrifice-the sort of treatment
that transgresses first principles of mutual respect and common human-
ity.''8-  Fair procedures are thus an end in themselves, an end that
often interferes with the factual adjudication of guilt or innocence.
The constitutional requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, 3 for
instance, necessarily increases the likelihood of erroneous acquittal."4
Society accepts the increased chance of error because, while the "final
balance sheet obviously matters, . .. the process by which it is
achieved matters more." 'st
The Burger Court's disregard of the procedural aspects of the trial
risks undermining these values. To condition the prosecutor's duty to
disclose material evidence on a reviewing judge's assessment of the de-
fendant's guilt smacks of collusion and jeopardizes apparent fairness in
criminal proceedings. Likewise, a standard of materiality that equates
the discovery of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor with dis-
covery of evidence from a neutral source does little to promote the ideal
that the state's primary aim in a criminal proceeding is to "seek justice
above victory.""s Additionally, the standard adopted in Agurs fails to
Confidence in the substance of the system is thus wedded to confidence in
its appearance or illusion.
For a discussion of the importance of the appearance of fairness in criminal proceedings
and the ritualistic function of the trial, see Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1329, 1372-93 (1971).
81. Speaking for the Court, Justice Fortas observed:
Due process of law is the primary and undispensible foundation of individual
freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which de-
fines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the State
may exercise. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "The history of American
freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure."
in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1967). See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477
(1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[Iln the development of our liberty, insistence upon
procedural regularity has been a large factor").
82, Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 386-87 n.65 (1970).
83. in re Winship, 397 U.S. 359 (1970).
84. 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1092, 1103-04 nn.40-41.
85. Tribe. supra note 82, at 387 (emphasis original).
86. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 108 (1935).
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induce prosecutors to make actual voluntary disclosures because the
burden of proving materiality imposed on the defendant is extremely
high. A more lenient standard that prompts prosecutors to resolve
close questions in favor of defendants would reaffirm the fundamental
values embodied in the concept of procedural due process and
would not impair the factual accuracy of the trial. Indeed, by increas-
ing the information base available to the trier of fact, it would
probably increase the accuracy of the factfinding process.87
Finally, the Agurs standard may provide insufficient checks on bad
faith nondisclosures by the prosecutors. In the Rule 33 situation, pros-
ecutorial misconduct is not an issue when evidence is discovered from
a neutral source after trial.88 On the other hand, when prosecutors
hold the information, as they do in nondisclosure cases, bad faith ac-
tions by them are always possible. In close cases it will often be diffi-
cult to distinguish between good and bad faith prosecutorial decisions,
so that the most effective way to deter bad faith actions by prosecutors
is to apply a lenient standard of materiality.
In Brady v. Maryland,9 the Warren Court found that prosecutors
were constitutionally obligated to safeguard a defendant's right to a fair
trial by disclosing material evidence favorable to his cause.90 This duty
reaffirmed society's commitment to the concept of procedural fairness
to defendants. 91 The majority's opinion devalues that commitment.
By fashioning a standard of materiality that focuses solely on the accur-
acy of the verdict, the Burger Court has unfortunately eliminated the
spirit, if not also the substance, of the prosecutor's constitutional duty
to disclose.
87. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
88. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
89. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
90. Id. at 87.
91. See notes 29-30, 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
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